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Abstract: This study investigates the association between government incentives and 
defined benefit pension funding. The government provides tax incentives to defined 
benefit plans to buoy pension funding. In addition, sponsors of these plans must pay 
insurance premiums to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). This agency 
charges underfunded plans higher premiums, designed to encourage pension funding. 
While tax benefits provide positive reinforcement for pension contributions, PBGC 
premiums serve as negative reinforcement for firms that fail to fund their defined benefit 
plans. Since millions of beneficiaries and retirees rely on pension income, it is important 
to understand whether government incentives effectively motivate pension funding. I find 
tax benefits and PBGC premiums to be significantly positively associated with defined 
benefit pension contributions. This implies that firms contribute to their plans in order to 
achieve tax savings and that risk adjusted premiums effectively incentivize defined 
benefit investment. Finally, I find that plan sponsors make higher excess pension 
contributions following the election of President Trump. This suggests that firms boost 
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In March 2017 Delta Airlines Inc. issued $2 billion in unsecured notes in order to fund 
excess defined benefit pension plan contributions.1 Delta had just disclosed in its 2016 10-K, filed 
in February 2017, that it planned to contribute a total of $700 million in excess contributions. The 
decision to issue the unsecured notes allowed Delta to nearly quadruple its excess pension 
contributions, from a planned $700 million to $2.7 billion. Delta did not provide explicit 
reasoning behind its decision to drastically increase discretionary contributions. What spurred the 
company to so dramatically boost its excess pension contributions in 2017? This paper examines 
how government incentives and changes to these incentives drive excess pension contribution 
decisions. 
Although fewer companies offer defined benefit retirement plans to new employees than in the 
past, these plans still play a significant role in many companies’ financial statements. For 
example, any firm with an underfunded defined benefit plan shows a liability on its balance sheet 
for the amount of underfunding. A firm sponsoring an overfunded plan shows an asset on its 
balance sheet for the amount of overfunding.
                                                           
1 Section 430 of the Internal Revenue Code outlines the amount of mandatory pension contributions that 
firms are required to make. Any voluntary contribution made in excess of this required amount is a 
discretionary or excess contribution.   
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In addition to the effect that defined benefit plans have on firms’ financial statements, millions of 
people rely on defined benefit pension payouts as a significant source of income during retirement. 
The government provides certain incentives, such as tax deductions, for firms to fund their defined 
benefit plans, and it is important to understand how these incentives and changes to these incentives 
motivate firms’ pension funding decisions.  
In this paper, I examine how government incentives drive firm investment decisions. 
Specifically, I examine five research questions. First, are the tax benefits afforded to defined benefit 
plans associated with excess pension contributions? Second, I examine whether the association 
between these tax benefits and excess pension contributions is stronger for firms that are more tax 
savvy.2 Additionally, I examine whether increased insurance premiums charged to firms with 
underfunded plans are associated with higher excess pension contributions, and I also examine 
whether this effect is independent of firms’ tax benefits. Finally, I examine whether anticipation of 
U.S. tax reform is associated with higher excess contributions to defined benefit plans.  
This topic is of interest not only to researchers, but also to regulators, investors, plan 
participants, and beneficiaries of defined benefit pension plans. The U.S. government provides certain 
tax advantages to defined benefit plans to encourage firms to offer these retirement plans and to fund 
existing plans.3 The extent to which these tax incentives actually drive pension funding determines 
the effectiveness of such incentives. In addition, U.S. tax reform may have unintended consequences 
and may actually disincentivize future excess pension contributions because the decrease in the U.S. 
corporate tax rate under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 reduces the tax savings associated 
                                                           
2 Prior theory work shows that firms should utilize the marginal tax rate when making incremental investment 
decisions. The marginal tax rate is the present value of the taxes paid on an additional dollar earned by the 
corporation (Scholes et al. 2014). Firms should use the marginal tax rate to calculate the tax benefits associated 
with pension investment. Instead, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2017) find that tax executives at many 
firms utilize the effective or average tax rate to make incremental investment decisions. These firms do not 
appear to be tax savvy and Graham et al. (2017) find that they are not as responsive to investment opportunities 
as firms that utilize the theoretically correct marginal tax rate. 
3 Pension contributions are tax deductible, and the government does not tax pension investment growth.  
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with excess pension contributions. It is also important to examine the association between non-tax 
factors, such as insurance premiums, and pension contributions and to study how the interaction 
between tax and non-tax factors influences firm behavior. This paper helps regulators understand the 
effectiveness of existing incentives for pension funding.  
Investors care about firm investment decisions because they desire to maximize their wealth. 
When firms decide to invest additional dollars in defined benefit plans, they may be sacrificing 
certain growth opportunities. Alternatively, discretionary pension contributions may provide a signal 
to investors about a lack of such opportunities. If firms lack growth opportunities, defined benefit 
contributions may be the best use of firm resources. Finally, employees who are plan participants, 
unions representing these employees, and plan beneficiaries care about the effectiveness of 
governmental incentives related to defined benefit pension plans, and these groups may lobby for 
more effective incentives so that plans are fully funded in the future.4  
In order to empirically test my research questions, I regress excess pension contributions 
made by plan sponsors on government funding incentives and relevant control variables. The sample 
period for my main tests includes the years 2009 to 2016. I begin my sample in 2009 because the data 
for my dependent variable is available from the Department of Labor (DOL) beginning in 2009. 
Following Thomas (1988), I exclude defense contractors and public utilities from my sample since 
firms operating in these industries systematically overfund their defined benefit plans.5 While prior 
literature often uses the pension funding ratio to examine the funding of defined benefit plans, I use 
excess pension contributions as my dependent variable. For my first research question, I proxy for the 
tax benefits associated with a defined benefit pension plan by using a firm’s simulated marginal tax 
                                                           
4 For the remainder of this paper, when I reference fully funded plans, I am referring to defined benefit pension 
plans that are either fully funded or overfunded according to the GAAP definition of funding. See footnote 2 for 
the GAAP definition of funding. 
5 Under cost-plus or reimbursable contracts, firms are reimbursed for their expenses. Defense contractors and 
public utilities typically operate under cost-plus or reimbursable contracts. These contracts incentivize firms to 
overfund their defined benefit plans, regardless of the pension funding incentives in place.  
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rate (Graham 1996 and Blouin et al. 2010).  To test my second research question, I create a variable 
to capture firms that are tax savvy. These firms are able to sustain low average tax rates and a low 
variance in effective tax rates over a five-year period. I regress excess pension contributions on the 
interaction between a firm’s marginal tax rate and an indicator variable for tax savvy firms. To test 
my third and fourth research questions, I calculate plan-year variable rate premiums using data from 
Form 5500 filings made publicly available by the DOL. Finally, I utilize a natural experiment, the 
expectation of a tax rate decrease following the election of President Trump, in an attempt to provide 
even stronger evidence than evidence provided in prior literature or the evidence provided in my first 
test regarding the association between pension funding and the tax benefits associated with defined 
benefit plans.  
The market did not expect Donald J. Trump to win the U.S. presidential election, making his 
victory an exogenous shock. Polls leading up to the 2016 presidential election “consistently projected 
Hillary Clinton as defeating Donald Trump” (Mercer, Deane, and McGeeney 2016). The Wall Street 
Journal referred to Trump’s win as a “stunning presidential victory that shook the political 
establishment to its core and sent shock waves through global markets” (Driebusch, Kantchev, and 
Krouse 2016). The U.S. futures market fell nearly 900 points overnight following Trump’s victory 
before recovering and then soaring (Driebusch et al. 2016). Since his election came as a surprise, 
President Trump’s tax policies had not been priced into the market. Therefore, President Trump’s 
election provides a strong setting in which to study the impact of declining corporate tax rates on 
pension funding levels. I examine the change in firms’ excess pension contributions after the election 
of President Trump. Following the election, firms anticipated that tax reform would reduce the tax 
benefits associated with making pension contributions. This setting allows me to examine an 




I document five main results. First, I find that a firm’s tax benefits are significantly positively 
associated with excess pension contributions to its defined benefit plan(s). This suggests that firms 
invest in their defined benefit plans in excess of mandatory contribution amounts in order to receive 
additional tax savings. Second, I find that the association between a firm’s tax benefits and its excess 
pension contributions is no stronger for tax savvy firms. This result implies that firms that 
successfully sustain low cash effective tax rates are no more likely to utilize excess pension 
contributions to obtain additional cash tax savings than less tax savvy firms. Next, I find the variable 
rate insurance premiums charged to sponsors of defined benefit pension plans to be significantly 
positively associated with excess pension contributions. This suggests that firms contribute more to 
their defined benefit plans in order to lower future risk adjusted premium charges. I find that the 
positive association between variable rate premiums and excess pension contributions is significantly 
stronger for plan-years with the highest and lowest tax benefits associated with defined benefit plans. 
This suggests that variable rate premiums effectively incentivize excess pension contributions for 
both high and low tax benefit sponsors. Finally, I find that firms made higher excess pension 
contributions following the election of President Trump. Since Trump’s election was an exogenous 
shock to the market that increased the probability of corporate tax reform, my results imply that plan 
sponsors reacted to this shock by making higher contributions to their defined benefits in order to 
receive higher tax benefits before these tax benefits associated with pension contributions decreased 
under tax reform.   
I make several contributions to the literature. First, I contribute to the literature on whether 
taxes matter. This stream of literature begins with the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
These authors find that in a frictionless world, the source of a firm’s financing is irrelevant. However, 
in the presence of taxes and other market frictions, a firm must consider its financing source. I 
provide evidence that tax benefits influence pension funding levels. Firms value the tax savings 
afforded to them by defined benefit plans, and I am able to provide strong evidence on the association 
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between tax benefits and pension investments by utilizing a natural experiment. This contribution is 
significant because a recent paper by Ljunqgvist, Zhang, and Zuo (2017) acknowledges that prior 
empirical work finds very little evidence of the impact of taxes on firms’ investment levels.  
Next I contribute to the literature on pension investment. Prior theoretical and empirical 
literature examines which factors motivate pension investment (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977; Black 
1980; Tepper 1981; Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart 1987; Francis and Reiter 1987; Thomas 1988; 
Asthana 1999; Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 2010). Most empirical studies aggregate plans by 
plan sponsor and examine firm-year data. I utilize publicly available plan level data from the DOL 
and examine my research questions using plan-year data, controlling for plan sponsor characteristics. 
In addition, most prior studies utilize the funded status of a pension plan as a proxy for pension 
funding levels. This is a noisy measure of funding since market performance and management 
manipulation influence a firm’s funded status (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 2006). My measure of 
pension funding is less noisy because I examine excess pension contributions for each plan-year 
utilizing Form 5500 data. To my knowledge, I am also the first to examine the association between 
the variable rate premiums charged to plan sponsors and pension contributions.  
The rest of my paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides institutional details 
and a review of the related literature. The third section provides my hypothesis development. The 
fourth section describes my sample selection process and research design. The fifth section discusses 






INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
Institutional Details 
 Defined benefit pensions are a type of retirement plan offered by firms. Corporations 
sponsor defined benefit plans and pledge retirement benefits to their employees. These benefits 
are typically based upon the employee’s age, tenure with the company, and earnings history. 
Sponsors of defined benefit plans (corporations) bear the investment risk of contributing financial 
assets to the retirement plan and hire a third party to invest and manage these dedicated pension 
assets. Section 430 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies the minimum amount of annual 
pension contributions that firms are required to make.6 However, the government also institutes 
specific incentives to encourage excess pension contributions.  
Tax incentives encourage pension contributions because contributions made to defined 
benefit plans are tax deductible, and pension investment growth remains untaxed.7 Prior to the  
                                                           
6 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added Internal Revenue Code section 430. Previously, Code Section 
412 provided the guidelines for minimum pension funding requirements. Section 303 of Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act parallels Internal Revenue Code section 430 and also specifies the rules 
for minimum funding. Plan sponsors that fail to contribute the minimum required contributions to their 
defined benefit plans must pay an excise tax.  
7 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 increased the tax benefits related to defined benefit retirement plans. 
Under this law, sponsors may deduct pension contributions that contribute to the overfunding of their plans 
rather than receiving deductions only up to the point where their plans are fully funded.  
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TCJA of 2017, the corporate tax rate was 35 percent, meaning every $1 million in pension 
contributions resulted in $350,000 of tax savings. However, the TCJA effectively lowers the 
corporate tax rate to 21 percent, meaning a $1 million pension contribution now results in only 
$210,000 in tax savings. While tax benefits provide positive reinforcement for pension 
contributions, risk adjusted insurance premiums charged to plan sponsors serve as negative 
reinforcement for firms that fail to fund their defined benefit plans. 
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in order to 
protect defined benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries. ERISA established the Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC provides insurance for defined benefit 
pension plans. Plan sponsors must pay premiums to the PBGC, and in return, the PBGC pays out 
pension benefits (subject to limitations) to participants or beneficiaries of failed defined benefit 
plans.8 The PBGC charges two different types of premiums to plan sponsors. First, they charge a 
per participant flat rate premium to all sponsors of single-employer plans. In addition, the PBGC 
charges sponsors with unfunded vested benefits (UVBs) a variable rate premium, which is subject 
to a per participant cap. The variable rate premium has been nine dollars per $1,000 of UVB since 
1991, but the PBGC began to increase the variable rate premium in 2014. The 2017 variable rate 
premium was $34 per $1,000 of UVB, subject to a $517 per participant cap.9 This PBGC variable 
rate premium serves as a risk adjusted premium, which negatively reinforces the underfunding of 
pension benefits. 
 
                                                           
8 During bankruptcy proceedings for United Airlines in 2005, the PBGC agreed to pay out $6.6 billion of 
United Airline’s total $9.8 billion in pension liabilities. The amount that the PBGC pays out when a 
pension plan terminates depends on the retiree ages and the amount of pension investment the plan had 
when it terminated. 
9 The variable rate premium will not be as strong of an incentive for plan sponsors that are subject to the 
per-participant cap because their variable rate premiums are limited. The per-participant cap in place biases 





Prior literature proposes several theories to explain firms’ pension investment decisions. 
One stream of literature demonstrates that the contract between defined benefit plan sponsors and 
the PBGC results in the creation of a put option (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977). This option 
becomes exercisable when the plan sponsor files for bankruptcy and the PBGC takes over the 
sponsor’s pension assets and payment of benefits. To maximize the value of this put option firms 
engage in risk shifting (moral hazard), minimizing defined benefit contributions and maximizing 
the risk of pension assets. The PBGC’s heavy historic reliance on a flat rate premium, which fails 
to adjust for pension underfunding exacerbates this moral hazard problem (Niehaus 1990). 
However, a constraint to risk shifting exists. Pension plan sponsors that have engaged in risk 
shifting and avoid bankruptcy must continue to make required minimum annual pension 
contributions using the corporation’s resources. These required pension contributions limit firms’ 
opportunities to make capital expenditures, pay dividends, or invest in positive net present value 
projects.  
Bodie et al. (1987) find that firms facing higher risk are less likely to fully fund their 
pension plans. Hsieh, Chen, and Ferris (1994) examine 176 firms in 1989 and find that sponsors 
with underfunded plans are severely undercharged by the PBGC while sponsors with overfunded 
plans pay fair premiums. Firms being undercharged by the PBGC have incentives to engage in 
risk shifting. More recently, Guan and Lui (2016) document that financially distressed US 
sponsors with severely underfunded defined benefit plans do engage in risk shifting. They also 
find that risk-adjusted premiums implemented by the UK helped to curb this risk shifting 




Francis and Reiter (1987) regress a firm’s pension funding ratio on a measure of firm 
risk. They predict the association between firm risk and a firm’s funding status to be negative, 
consistent with the pension put theory and risk shifting behavior by firms. However, they actually 
find that firms with more risk have more fully funded pension plans, which is inconsistent with 
risk shifting. Rauh (2009) finds that firms facing potential bankruptcy engage in risk management 
rather than risk shifting, investing in safer pension assets in order to avoid future financial 
constraints. An, Huang, and Zhang (2013) also find that sponsors invest in safer pension assets 
when their plans are underfunded and when they face bankruptcy risk. However, they find that 
defined benefit sponsors who ultimately freeze their plans, terminate their plans, or convert their 
plans to defined contribution plans engage in risk shifting behavior. Anantharaman and Lee 
(2013) reconcile the mixed evidence on risk shifting and risk management by examining how 
compensation structures impact pension investment. They find that risk shifting is stronger when 
management compensation structures include incentives for risk taking.10 
Another stream of literature focuses on how tax incentives motivate pension investment. 
Theory work in this area predicts that firms will fully fund their defined benefit plans and invest 
pension assets entirely in debt in order to take advantage of the tax benefits associated with these 
plans (Black 1980; Tepper 1981). Frank (2002) tests the asset allocation portion of the tax benefit 
hypothesis and finds that firms with higher marginal tax rates invest more heavily in bonds, 
providing evidence that explicit taxes impact decision making for defined benefit plans. Early 
work examining how firms fund their defined benefit plans provides weak evidence that tax 
incentives are associated with funding decisions. Bodie et al. (1987) provide evidence that 
pension decisions are integrated with a firm’s overall corporate financial policy.11 When they 
                                                           
10 Stock options provide an example of compensation that incentivizes risk taking. Stock options are more 
valuable when stock volatility increases because there is a higher chance of reaching the option price. 
Therefore, management is more likely to take more risks in order to increase stock volatility.  
11 Bodie et al. (1987) examine two primary theories on pension funding. The traditional perspective states 
that pension funds are completely separate from the corporation and its shareholders and that these funds 
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partition their already limited sample, they find evidence that firms with lower tax liabilities have 
significantly lower pension funding ratios.  
Francis and Reiter (1987) test several theories of pension funding, including the tax 
benefit hypothesis. Using a tax benefit indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss 
carryforward and zero otherwise, they find that a firm’s pension funding ratio is positively 
associated with a firm’s tax benefit. Thomas (1988) modifies the tax benefit hypothesis proposed 
by Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) and allows tax rates to vary across firms and over time. He 
acknowledges that the tax variables used in prior empirical papers measure tax status with error. 
Thomas (1988) attempts to capture a firm’s marginal tax rate by first classifying firms as high tax 
firms if they report positive federal tax payments. Firms that report federal tax losses are 
considered low tax firms and are further categorized based on whether they plan to carryforward 
or carry back these tax losses.12 Firms that carryforward tax losses are expected to receive the 
lowest tax benefits from defined benefit contributions. Thomas (1988) provides stronger evidence 
that tax status is an important determinant of pension funding using these more sophisticated 
measures of a firm’s tax status. However, Thomas (1988) states that his results on the relation 
between tax status and pension funding are exploratory. A contemporaneous working paper by 
Gaertner, Lynch, and Vernon (2018) extends Thomas (1998) by examining the impact of the 
TCJA on defined benefit pension contributions. Their paper aggregates plans by plan sponsor and 
examines firm-year data. My paper uses more detailed plan-year data, examining contributions 
that plan sponsors make to each defined benefit plan individually. In addition, their paper focuses 
mainly on the impact of the TCJA, while my paper focuses on both tax incentives and insurance 
premium incentives. While I also examine the impact of the TCJA on defined benefit pension 
                                                                                                                                                                             
are managed without regard to a firm’s corporate financial policy or the interests of shareholders. The 
corporate financial perspective holds the opposite view. This theory states that pension funding decisions 
are an important aspect of a firm’s overall corporate financial policy and that firms do consider the interests 
of shareholders in making pension funding decisions.  
12 For tax years beginning after December 31, 2017. the TCJA no longer allows firms to carry back tax 
losses, but carry backs were allowed during my sample period.  
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contributions, this is an additional test used in my paper to provide stronger evidence on the 
association between tax benefits and pension contributions rather than the main focus of my 
paper. 
Since the Thomas (1988) paper, several papers have examined how to simulate a firm’s 
marginal tax rate. Theoretically, a firm should use its marginal tax rate to make pension funding 
decisions. Scholes et al. 2014 define marginal tax rate as the “present value of current and 
expected future taxes paid on an additional dollar of income earned today.” Shevlin (1990) 
develops a way to simulate a firm’s marginal tax rate by assuming that a firm’s taxable income 
follows a random walk. This allows him to estimate taxable income 18 years into the future in 
order to incorporate the impact of tax loss carryforwards on a firm’s marginal tax rate. Graham 
(1996a) extends this simulated marginal tax rate by incorporating the effect of investment tax 
credits (ITCs) and the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Graham (1996b) shows that the simulated 
tax rate is the best proxy for marginal tax rate, although he admits that proxies such as the one 
utilized by Thomas (1988) are easier to estimate and do a reasonable job. Blouin et al. (2010) 
improves upon Graham’s simulated marginal tax rate by using a non-parametric approach to 
estimate a firm’s future taxable income. This provides better estimates of future taxable income 
for simulating marginal tax rates since income is mean-reverting and does not follow a random 
walk (Brooks and Buckmaster 1976; Brown 1993).   
Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2010) examine the market reaction to the Pension 
Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, which accelerated funding requirements and increased the tax 
deduction available for defined benefit plans. Using Graham’s simulated marginal tax rate, the 
authors find that firms with higher marginal tax rates achieved higher cumulative abnormal 
returns following the PPA 2006. The positive market reaction indicates the increased level of 
pension contributions qualifying for tax deductibility most benefits firms with the highest 
marginal tax rates.  
13 
 
Even though marginal tax rates are the theoretically correct rate for firms to utilize when 
making capital structure choices or investment decisions, a survey paper finds that many tax 
executives fail to use the marginal tax rate for such decisions (Graham et al. 2017). Many tax 
executives instead utilize the statutory tax rate or the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
effective tax rate (GAAP ETR) to make investment decisions. If these rates are close to a firm’s 
marginal tax rate, they may be acceptable for decision making. However, Graham et al. (2017) 
provides empirical evidence that firms utilizing the GAAP ETR for decision making have lower 









Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) predict that firms will maximize contributions to their 
pension plans and invest pension assets entirely in debt in order to take advantage of the tax 
benefits associated with defined benefit plans. The tax benefits associated with such plans are 
twofold. Pension contributions made by firm sponsors are tax deductible, and sponsors do not pay 
taxes on any gains achieved by pension assets. If sponsors borrow money in order to fund pension 
contributions, they receive an additional tax deduction on the interest associated with those 
borrowings. Frank (2002) tests the asset allocation portion of these theories and finds that firms 
with higher marginal tax rates invest more heavily in bonds. Thomas (1988) modifies the tax 
benefit hypothesis proposed by Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) by allowing tax rates to vary 
across firms and over time, and he provides evidence that as a firm’s tax status declines, the 
firm’s pension contributions decline. I test the tax benefit hypothesis theory using a more 
sophisticated measure of marginal tax rate. Shevlin (1990) develops a simulated marginal tax rate 
by assuming that a firm’s taxable income follows a random walk. This allows him to estimate 
taxable income 18 years into the future in order to incorporate the effect of tax loss carryforwards 
on marginal tax rate. Graham (1996a) improves upon this simulated marginal tax rate by 
incorporating the effects of investment tax credits and alternative minimum tax on a firm’s 
marginal tax rate. Blouin et al. (2010) improves the simulated marginal tax rate further by using a
15 
 
non-parametric procedure to forecast taxable income since prior literature shows that income fails 
to follow a random walk (Brooks and Buckmaster 1976; Brown 1993).13 I use both the Graham 
(1996a) and Blouin et al. (2010) or BCG measures to estimate marginal tax rates for H1, and I 
predict that a firm’s marginal tax rate will be significantly positively associated with its excess 
pension contributions.14  
H1: Excess pension contributions are positively associated with the tax benefits derived from 
making these contributions.  
According to theory in finance, firms use their marginal tax rates to make incremental 
financing and investing choices (Graham 1996a). Graham et al. (2017) survey tax executives and 
find that many of these executives fail to utilize marginal tax rates to make incremental 
investment and compensation decisions. Instead, nearly a third of these firms use effective 
(average) tax rates to make such decisions. Firms with high marginal tax rates may not utilize the 
benefits available to them via pension contributions if the tax executives of these firms are 
utilizing an average tax rate to make pension contribution decisions. Graham et al. (2017) finds 
that the association between investment opportunities and capital expenditures is weaker for firms 
claiming to use effective tax rates to make investment decisions when the absolute value of the 
difference between a firm’s marginal tax rate and effective tax rate is larger. This provides 
evidence that firms that are more tax savvy make different investment decisions than less tax 
savvy firms. Since I do not have the proprietary survey data that reveals which firms claim to use 
effective tax rates for decision-making, I instead create a proxy for tax savvy firms. I use this 
proxy to test whether firms that are more tax savvy make different pension investment decisions 
than less tax savvy firms. Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt (2012) provide a tax avoidance 
continuum that shows which commonly used proxies for tax avoidance are more likely to capture 
                                                           
13 My primary measure of MTR is the Graham (1996a) measure because the Blouin et al (2010) or BCG 
measure is only available through 2016.  
14 Section 430 of the Internal Revenue Code outlines the amount of mandatory pension contributions that 
firms are required to make. Any voluntary contribution made in excess of this required amount is a 
discretionary or excess contribution.   
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tax planning activities and which proxies are more likely to capture tax aggressive behavior. Both 
the GAAP ETR and the Cash ETR fall on the less aggressive side of the continuum. Tax savvy 
firms are firms that wisely engage in tax planning in order to consistently reduce their cash tax 
payments. My proxy for tax savvy firms should not capture firms with aggressive tax behavior. 
My tax savvy observations are for plan-years in the lowest quintile of average cash ETR and the 
lowest quintile for standard deviation of cash ETR over a five-year period. I predict that the 
association between a firm’s marginal tax rate and its excess pension contributions will be 
stronger for tax savvy firms.   
H2: The association between excess pension contributions and the tax benefits derived from these 
contributions is significantly higher for tax savvy firms. 
All sponsors of defined benefit pension plans pay the PBGC a flat rate premium, which is 
a fixed amount charged by the PBGC for each participant covered by the defined benefit plan. In 
addition, firms with unfunded vested benefits (UVBs) must pay an additional variable rate 
premium to the PBGC.15 These variable rate premiums are designed to incentivize plan sponsors 
to increase contributions and fully fund (or overfund) their vested benefits.    
While the tax benefits of defined benefit plans serve to positively reinforce plan 
contributions, these variable rate premiums charged by the PBGC serve as negative 
reinforcement. Prior literature examines how the existence of PBGC and its premium structure 
impacts pension contributions (Niehaus 1990). Theory work predicts that the contract between 
plan sponsors and the PBGC creates a put option (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977). This option is 
exercisable when the plan sponsor files for bankruptcy and the PBGC takes control of the 
                                                           
15 The PBGC defines unfunded vested benefits as “the excess, if any, of the premium funding target over 
the fair market value of the plan assets.” See https://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/help/ 
instructions/2012/HowToDetermineUVB.htm). Firms calculate their funding target based on ERISA 303, 
which stipulates minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans. The premium funding target 
refers to vested benefits under the plan rather than all benefits. For financial reporting purposes, a plan is 
underfunded when the projected benefit obligation (PBO) exceeds the fair market value of plan assets 
(FVPA). The PBO considers all pension benefits that will be owed to plan participants, rather than just 
vested benefits.  
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sponsor’s pension assets and assumes responsibility for benefit payments (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 
1977). To maximize the value of the put option, firms minimize contributions to their plans and 
maximize the risk of pension asset allocation, which creates a moral hazard problem. The PBGC 
has historically relied on a flat rate premium structure. The insurance agency introduced variable 
rate premiums in 1988, but these variable rate premiums have been relatively low until the PBGC 
began increasing them in 2014. The PBGC’s variable rate premium was $9 per $1,000 of UVBs 
from 1991 through 2013. In 2014, the variable rate premium increased 56% to $14 per $1,000 of 
UVBs. Each year from 2014 to 2017, the PBGC hiked its variable rate premium even more. In 
2018, the PBGC will charge a variable rate premium of $38 per $1,000 of UVBs, a 171% 
increase over the PBGC’s 2014 variable rate premium. Historic heavy reliance by the PBGC on a 
flat rate premium, which fails to adjust for pension underfunding, exacerbates the moral hazard 
problem created by the pension put option (Niehaus 1990). Using a sample of firms from 2003-
2011, Guan and Lui (2016) document that financially distressed US sponsors with severely 
underfunded defined benefit plans engage in risk shifting, meaning these firms invest plan assets 
in riskier equity securities. However, they also find that risk-adjusted premiums implemented by 
the UK helped to curb risk shifting behavior. Their results suggest that risk-adjusted (variable 
rate) premiums implemented by the PBGC could have a similar impact on the risk shifting 
behavior of US firms.  If the higher variable rate premiums charged by the PBGC in recent years 
effectively incentivize sponsors of underfunded plans to contribute to their pension plans, I 
predict that excess pension contributions will be significantly positively associated with variable 
rate premiums for a sample of underfunded plans. 
H3: Excess pension contributions are positively associated with variable rate premiums. 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) note a lack of empirical evidence on the interaction of 
tax and non-tax factors that impact deferred compensation, such as defined benefit pension plans. 
After establishing that tax benefits and variable rate premiums charged by the PBGC are both 
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associated with pension contributions, I examine how these governmental incentives interact to 
impact pension funding levels. I expect that the association between excess pension contributions 
and variable rate premiums to be driven by firms with low tax benefits associated with their 
defined benefit plans. Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart (1987) find evidence that firms with 
higher risk and lower tax liabilities underfund their pension obligations. If PBGC variable rate 
premiums have no effect on firms with high tax benefits because these firms contribute to their 
pension plans in order to receive the tax benefits, then I predict a weaker association between 
excess pension contributions and variable rate premiums for these firms.  
H4a: High tax benefits weaken the positive association between excess pension contributions and 
variable rate premiums.  
On the other hand, if firms with low tax benefits are not motivated by tax incentives for 
pension contribution but are motivated by the PBGC’s variable rate premiums, then I predict a 
stronger positive association between excess pension contributions and variable rate premiums 
for firms with low tax benefits. In essence, firms that previously underfunded due to a lack of tax 
benefits, now contribute more to their pension plans in an attempt to avoid higher premium 
payments.   
H4b: Low tax benefits strengthen the positive association between excess pension contributions 
and variable rate premiums. 
If a firm’s marginal tax rate is a significant determinant of its pension funding level, firms 
should react to a reduction in the corporate tax rate, which is expected to lower the marginal tax 
rate for most firms. The election of President Donald J. Trump in 2016 was an unexpected 
(exogenous) event that increased the probability of tax reform and a lower U.S. corporate tax rate. 
I predict that firms contributed an abnormal amount to their pension plans following the 2016 
election in anticipation of a reduced corporate tax rate and lower tax benefits associated with 
defined benefit pension plans.  
19 
 
H5: Plan sponsors make excess pension contributions after the 2016 presidential election in 






SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample Selection   
 I outline my sample selection in Table 1. I begin by collecting plan level data for defined 
benefit plans filed with the Department of Labor (DOL).16 Every sponsor of an employee benefit 
plan with 100 or more participants at the beginning of the plan year must file a Form 5500 with 
the DOL. Sponsors of defined benefit plans must file a Form 5500 Schedule SB, which includes 
actuarial information regarding the defined benefit plan. I begin my sample by identifying all 
plans that filed a Form 5500 Schedule SB for plan years 2009 through 2016.  Next, I match these 
plans with data for the plan sponsors available via Compustat. In order to obtain the maximum 
amount of matches between Form 5500 data and Compustat, I use guidance provided by Madrian 
and Gron (2004).17 I first match on Employer Identification Number (EIN), which is the primary 
identifier collected by the DOL. Next, following Madrian and Gron (2004), I add additional 
observations to my sample by matching the first 15 characters of plan sponsor name and state to 
                                                           
16 The DOL compiles the information from Form 5500 filings by year. These datasets are available via the 
DOL’s website at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/public-disclosure/foia/form-
5500-datasets. Beginning with 2009 plan years, the DOL requires that plan sponsors file the Form 5500 and 
related schedules electronically. Previously, the DOL accepted paper copies of the Form 5500 and related 
schedules. 
17 Madrian and Gron (2004) suggest matching on CUSIP, but the Form 5500 and related schedules do not 
require a CUSIP for my sample period. Therefore, I use EIN for my primary identifier.  
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firm name and state in Compustat.18 Using these two matching criteria, I obtain 9,702 unique plan 
year observations from 2009 to 2016.  
For my Graham sample used to test H1, I eliminate 1,040 of these plan year observations 
because I am unable to obtain a MTR for these observations.19 I eliminate an additional 665 
observations which are missing the relevant Compustat variables for my regressions. Following 
Thomas (1988) and Frank (2002), I eliminate defense contractors and public utilities because 
these firms have nontax incentives to overfund. Removing observations in these industries 
eliminates 1,262 plan years from my sample. Finally, I eliminate 9 plan years for which I cannot 
obtain excess pension contributions or variable rate premiums for these observations. This results 
in a total Graham sample for H1 of 6,726 plan year observations.  
For H2, I create a tax savvy variable, which requires me to calculate ETR average and 
ETR volatility quintiles. My sample for this test is 4,643 plan year observations after eliminating 
observations for which I cannot calculate my tax savvy variable. For H3, I eliminate firms that 
did not pay variable rate premiums in order to run this test on underfunded firms only. This 
results in a total of 2,281 plan year observations. For H4, I interact variable rate premiums with 
MTR quintiles. My sample is 2,281 plan year observations after eliminating observations for 
which I cannot calculate MTR quintiles.  
Finally, for H5, I begin with I obtain 10,553 unique plan year observations from 2009 to 2017. I 
eliminate 1,092 of these plan year observations because I am unable to obtain a MTR for these 
observations. I eliminate an additional 717 observations which are missing the relevant 
                                                           
18 The first 15 characters of the name field and state match does produce some false positives. I manually 
identify false positives and remove them from my sample. For example, Intercontinental Hotels Group 
(Form 5500) in Georgia matches with Intercontinental Exchange Inc. in Georgia The Intercontinental 
Hotels Group is a hotel company, and Intercontinental Exchange Inc. is a financial markets company. I 
remove this match.  
19 For my BCG sample used to test H1, I eliminate 1,452 observations because I am unable to obtain a 
MTR. I eliminate 642 observations missing relevant Compustat variables, 1,302 observations for defense 
contractors or public utilities, and 11 observations for which I cannot obtain my dependent variable or my 
variable rate premium variable. This results in a total sample of 6,295 plan year observations. 
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Compustat variables for my regressions. Eliminating defense contractors and public utility 
observations reduces my sample by 1,396 plan years. Finally, I eliminate 9 plan years for which I 
cannot obtain excess pension contributions or variable rate premiums for these observations. This 
results in a total sample for H5 of 7,339 plan year observations. 
Research Design 
 I use the following regression to test the association between marginal tax rate and excess 
pension contributions (H1). 
EPCit = β0 + β1MTRit + β2Profitabilityit + β3Leverageit + β4MTBit + β5Volatilityit + 
β6Deficitit + β7FundedStatust + β8PlanSizeit + β9VarPremiumit + 
β10Assetsit + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit 
 
I measure my dependent variable, Excess Pension Contributions (EPC) as 
contributions made by employers in excess of minimum required contributions to defined 
benefit plans scaled by the number of plan participants. H1 predicts that excess pension 
contributions are positively associated with the tax benefits derived from making these 
contributions, so I expect β1 > 0. I measure my variable of interest, marginal tax rate 
(MTR), using the methods employed by Graham (1996a) and Blouin et al. (2010).20,21  
I include a variety of control variables. First, I control for variable rate premiums 
(VarPremium), which is my variable of interest in H3. I predict β9 > 0. Results consistent 
with this prediction provide initial evidence consistent with H3. Firms with higher 
marginal tax rates are likely more profitable and employ less leverage than firms with 
lower marginal tax rates. The next control variable that I include is Profitability. I 
                                                           
20 The Blouin et al. (2010) or BCG measure is only on Compustat available through 2016. I employ this 
measure for H1, but I use the Graham (1996a) measure throughout the paper as my primary measure of 
MTR.   




measure Profitability as a firm’s average return on assets, scaled by total assets, and I 
expect β2 > 0. I measure Leverage as total long-term debt scaled by total assets, and I 
expect β3 < 0. Controlling for Profitability and Leverage also helps to control for 
financially distressed firms with a higher likelihood of exercising the put option 
associated with their defined benefit plans. I use Volatility and FundedStatus as 
additional controls for a firm’s likelihood to exercise its put option. I measure Volatility 
as the standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets for the prior five years, and I expect 
β5 < 0. FundedStatus is the fair value of a firm’s pension assets less its projected benefit 
obligation scaled by the firm’s market value of equity (Campbell et al. 2010). I expect β7 
< 0. I control for the possibility that firms’ excess internal cash flow is driving excess 
pension contributions by adding a variable for financing deficit. Firms with a financing 
deficit are less likely to have the funds to make excess pension contributions. I measure 
my Deficit variable by following Frank and Goyal (2003). Deficit is calculated by taking 
cash dividends, net firm investment, and change in working capital and subtracting out 
cash flow after interest and taxes. Firms with a positive amount for the Deficit variable 
have a financing deficit and firms with a negative amount for Deficit have a financing 
surplus (excess internal cash flow). I predict β6 < 0, indicating that firms with a financing 
surplus will make higher excess pension contributions. I control for a firm’s growth 
opportunities using MTB, measured as a firm’s market value scaled by its book value. I 
expect firms with larger growth opportunities to contribute less to their defined benefit 
plans and predict β4 < 0. I control for a firm’s defined benefit PlanSize, which I measure 
as the market value of plan assets scaled by total firm assets. I predict β8 > 0 indicating 
that firms with large defined benefit plans make larger excess contributions to these 
plans. I also control for firm size with the variable Assets, representing the natural log of 
total assets held by the firm sponsoring the defined benefit plan. I predict β10 > 0 
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indicating that larger firms make larger excess contributions to their defined benefit 
plans.  
Next I examine H2 and test whether the association between marginal tax rate and excess 
pension contributions is stronger for tax savvy firms.  
EPCit = β0 + β1MTRit + β2TaxSavvyit + β3TaxSavvy*MTRit + β4Profitabilityit + 
β5Leverageit + β6MTBit + β7Volatilityit + β8Deficitit + 
β9FundedStatusit + β10PlanSizeit + β11VarPremium+ β12Assets + 
Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit 
 
In order to perform this test, I create a TaxSavvy variable. I consider firms that are able to 
consistently sustain low cash effective tax rates to be tax savvy firms. I calculate cash ETR as 
taxes paid divided by pretax income less special items. I then calculate the average cash ETR for 
a consecutive five-year period. I also calculate the standard deviation of ETR for the same five-
year period (t to t-4). TaxSavvy is an indicator variable equal to 1 when firms are in the lowest 
quintile of average cash ETR and the lowest quintile for standard deviation of cash ETR, zero 
otherwise.   I expect β3 > 0, indicating that the association between MTR and EPC is stronger for 
tax savvy firms.  
In H3, I examine whether variable rate premiums are associated with excess pension 
contributions.  
EPCit = β0 + β1VarPremiumit + β2Profitabilityit + β3Leverageit + β4MTBit + β5Volatilityit 
+ β6Deficitit + β7FundedStatust + β8PlanSizeit + β9MTRit + 
β10Assetsit + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit 
 
H3 predicts that excess pension contributions are positively associated with variable rate 
premiums. I run this test only on plan year observations that incur variable rate premiums because 





premium by the PBGC. VarPremium is a firm’s variable rate premium charged by the PBGC. I 
obtain the data to calculate a firm’s variable rate premium from Form 5500 schedule SB, and I 
scale a firm’s variable rate premium by the number of plan participants.22 My variable of interest 
is VarPremium, and I predict β1 > 0. Firms will increase their discretionary pension contributions 
as their variable rate premiums increase. 
To test whether the association between excess pension contributions and 
variable rate premiums is independent of a firm’s tax status (H4a and H4b), I use the 
following regression. 
EPCit = β0 + β1HighMTRit + β2LowMTRit + β3VarPremiumit + 
β4HighMTR*VarPremiumit + β5LowMTR*VarPremiumit + 
β6Profitabilityit + β7Leverageit + β8MTBit + β9Volatilityit + 
β10Deficitit + β11FundedStatusit + β12PlanSizeit + β13Assetsit + 
Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit 
 
If firms with high tax benefits already make excess contributions to their plans in order to 
receive the associated tax benefits, PBGC premiums will be less effective for these firms. H4a 
predicts that high tax benefits weaken the positive association between excess pension 
contributions and variable rate premiums. On the other hand, firms with low tax benefits will be 
motivated by PBGC premiums. H4b predicts that low tax benefits will strengthen the positive 
association between excess pension contributions and variable rate premiums. In order to test my 
predictions, I create indicator variables for plans in the highest and lowest quintiles of MTR. 
HighMTR plans fall within the highest quintile of MTR for a given industry-year, and LowMTR 
plans fall within the lowest quintile of MTR for a given industry-year. I predict β4 < 0, indicating 
that the association between EPC and VarPremium is significantly lower for HighMTR plans. I 
                                                           




predict β5 > 0, indicating that the association between EPC and VarPremium is significantly 
higher for LowMTR plans.  
To test whether pension contributions increased following the election of President 
Trump (H5), I use the following regression. 
EPCit = β0 + β1Timeit + β2MTRit  + β3Time*MTRit  + β4Profitabilityit 
+ β5Leverageit  + β6MTBit + β7Volatilityit + 
β8Deficitit + β9FundedStatusit  + β10VarPremiumit  + 
β11Assetsit  + Industry Fixed Effects + εit 
(5) 
  
I create a Time variable equal to one if a plan year ends after November 2016, zero otherwise. My 
Time variable captures plan year observations that end after the election of President Trump. H5 
predicts that excess pension contributions are higher following the election of President Trump 
because firms react to an anticipated reduction in their marginal tax rates. Therefore, I expect β1 > 
0. I also expect that firms with higher marginal tax rates will increase their excess pension 







DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. My continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. The average plan sponsor in both my Graham and BCG samples 
reports an underfunded pension plan on its balance sheet, meaning its projected benefit obligation 
is larger than the fair value of its pension assets. The average Graham (BCG) marginal tax rate for 
my sample is 16 percent (30 percent). The average plan in my sample incurs a variable rate 
premium charged by the PBGC and contributes to its plan in excess of the required amount.  
I also compare my sample to the Compustat Universe.23 Observations in my sample are more 
profitable, employ less leverage, have less growth opportunities, are less volatile than the 
Compustat universe. In addition, while the average firm in the Compustat universe has a 
financing deficit, the average observation in my sample has a financing surplus. Although plan-
years in my sample are, on average, underfunded, they are better funded than the average firm in 
the Compustat universe. My sample contains plan-years with slightly larger plans but much 
smaller firms than the average Compustat firm. Finally, the average Graham marginal tax rate for 
my sample is almost identical to the average Graham marginal tax rate for the Compustat 
                                                           
23 Descriptives for the Compustat Universe are not included in Table 2.  
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universe. However, the BCG marginal tax rate for my sample (30 percent) is higher than the 
average MTR for the Compustat universe (21 percent). 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in hypothesis testing. The 
positive association between excess pension contributions and marginal tax rate suggests that 
firms with higher marginal tax rates contribute more to their defined benefit plans. This univariate 
evidence supports my first hypothesis. I also find a positive association between variable rate 
premiums and excess pension contributions, providing preliminary support for my third 
hypothesis. Consistent with my control variable predictions, I find that excess pension 
contributions are positively associated with profitability and negatively associated with leverage 
and volatility. In my Graham MTR sample, I find that FundedStatus is negatively associated with 
excess pension contributions, consistent with my predictions. However, I do not find a univariate 
association between FundedStatus and EPC for my BCG sample in Panel B. I do not find a 
univariate association between my Deficit variable or Assets and EPC. Finally, I predict that 
larger plans will contribute more to their defined benefit plans, but my univariate results suggest 
that PlanSize is negatively associated with EPC. 
Results 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from equation 1 used to test H1.24 The 
dependent variable is excess pension contributions, and my variable of interest is marginal tax 
rate. When I use Graham’s measure, the coefficient on MTR (β1) is positive and significant (t-
statistic = 2.50, p-value=.0001). Using the BCG measure, the coefficient on MTR (β1) is also 
positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.68, p-value=.0073). This implies that firms with higher 
marginal tax rates have higher excess pension contributions. This is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) as well as the findings of Thomas (1988). I 
                                                           
24 All of my results are based on two tailed tests.  
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provide stronger evidence for the association between tax rate and pension contributions by 
utilizing the sophisticated Graham (1996a) and Blouin et al. (2010) simulated marginal tax rates 
and a measure of excess pension contributions rather than total pension contributions.  
For my controls, I find that Profitability is significantly positively associated with excess 
pension contributions. This implies that more profitable plan sponsors and sponsors of larger 
defined benefit plans have higher excess pension contributions. I also find firm size (Assets) to be 
significantly positively associated with EPC. This implies that larger firms are more likely to 
make discretionary pension contributions. I find that VarPremium (β9) is significantly positively 
associated with EPC. Although, I only formally predict an association between these two 
variables for underfunded plans, it appears that this association holds in the broader sample of 
plan-years. Opposite of my predictions, I find that greater growth opportunities (MTB) are 
significantly positively associated with EPC.   I do not find a significant association between my 
Leverage and Volatility variables and my EPC variable. 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients from equation 2 used to test H2. I predict that 
the interaction of my TaxSavvy and MTR variables will be positive, indicating that the association 
between MTR and EPC is stronger for firms that are more tax savvy.  I do not find results 
consistent with my predictions. The coefficient on TaxSavvy*MTR (β3) is insignificant (t-statistic 
= 0.64, p-value=.5223).  
Table 6 reports the estimate coefficients from equation 3 used to test H3. I run this test 
only on plan year observations that incur variable rate premiums because this incentive should 
only affect underfunded plans that are charged an additional risk adjusted premium by the PBGC. 
I find that variable rate premiums (β1) are significantly positively associated with excess pension 
contributions (t-statistic = 5.84, p-value=<.0001). This implies that the premium structure utilized 
by the PBGC effectively combats the put option outlined by Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) 
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and the resulting moral hazard problem. This finding complements the finding by Guan and Lui 
(2016) who document that risk-adjusted premiums implemented by the UK helped to curb risk 
shifting behavior among defined benefit plan sponsors.  
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients from equation 4 used to test H4a and H4b. I 
predict that the interaction of my HighMTR and VarPremium (β4) variables will be negative, but I 
find that this interaction to be significantly positive (t-statistic=2.10, p-value=.0355). This 
suggests that variable rate premiums are very effective in soliciting excess pension funding. Even 
firms that have the highest tax benefits associated with defined benefit contributions contribute to 
their plans in order to avoid additional premium payments to the PBGC. I predict that the 
interaction of my LowMTR and VarPremium (β5) variables will be significantly positive, and I 
find results consistent with my expectations (t-statistic=2.11, p-value=.0353). These findings 
suggest that variable rate premiums tend to drive excess pension contributions, even for firms that 
receive higher tax benefits from contributing to their defined benefit pension plans.  
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients from equation 5 used to test H5. The dependent 
variable is excess pension contributions, and my variable of interest is time. The coefficient on 
Time (β1) is positive and significant (t-statistic = 566.656, p-value= <.0001). This implies that 
firms made higher excess pension contributions to their defined benefit plans following the 
election of President Trump due to the anticipation of tax rate decreases. Plan sponsors made 
these contributions in anticipation of lower tax benefits associated with making excess pension 
contributions under a lower corporate tax rate. The coefficient on Time*MTR is insignificant (t-
statistic = 778.497, p-value= 0.209). Although I expect the interaction to be significantly positive, 
the anticipation of such a drastic and seemingly permanent tax cut results in higher excess 
pension contributions on average for all plans and not just for plans with higher tax benefits 
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associated with excess pension contributions.25 My findings are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) as well as the findings of Thomas (1988). I 
provide strong evidence for the association between tax rate and pension contributions by 
utilizing Trump’s election as an exogenous shock that lowers the marginal tax rate for most firms.
                                                           
25 I do test H5 on a sample of HighMTR and LowMTR plans. The Time variable is significant at the 1 
percent level for the HighMTR plans and at the 10 percent level for the LowMTR plans. This provides 
some evidence that the anticipation of a tax decrease is more meaningful to plan sponsors with higher tax 








The government provides certain funding incentives to sponsors of defined benefit pension plans. 
Contributions to these plans are tax deductible and plan asset investment growth is not taxed. 
These tax incentives serve to encourage firms to make contributions to their defined benefit plans. 
In addition, sponsors of defined benefit plans must pay insurance premiums to the PBGC. The 
PBGC charges underfunded plans an additional variable rate premium designed to spur pension 
contributions. The tax benefits in place positively reinforce pension contributions, and PBGC 
premiums negatively reinforce funding by punishing sponsors with underfunded plans.. Since 
millions of employees, beneficiaries, and retirees rely or will rely on pension income, it is 
important to understand whether government incentives effectively motivate pension 
contributions.  
 In this study, I find that tax benefits are significantly positively associated with excess 
pension contributions. This suggests that plan sponsors value the tax savings associated with 
these benefit plans. I also find that variable rate premiums charged by the PBGC are also 
significantly positively associated with excess pension contributions. This implies that plan 
sponsors contribute more to their pension plans in order to avoid future variable rate premiums. I 
find that firms the positive association between variable rate premiums and excess pension 
contributions is significantly stronger for plan-years with the highest and lowest tax benefits
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associated with defined benefit plans. This implies that variable rate premiums effectively 
incentivize excess pension contributions for both high and low tax benefit sponsors. Finally, I 
find that firms made higher excess pension contributions following the election of President 
Trump. Since Trump’s election was an exogenous shock to the market that increased the 
probability of corporate tax reform, my results imply that plan sponsors reacted to this shock by 
making higher contributions to their defined benefits in order to receive higher tax benefits before 
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Deficit Financing Deficit = DIV + I + ΔW – C 
DIV is cash dividends (DV). 
• I is net investment and equals capital expenditures (CAPX) plus 
increase in investments (IVCH) plus acquisitions (AQC) plus other 
use of funds (FUSEO) less sale of property plant and equipment 
(SPPE) less sale of investment (SIV). 
• ΔW is the change in operating working capital (WCAP) plus the 
change in cash and cash equivalents (CHECH) plus the change in 
current debt (DLCCH). 
• C is cash flow after interest and taxes and equals income before 
extraordinary items (IB) plus depreciation and amortization (DPC) 
plus extraordinary items and discontinued operations (XIDOC) 
plus deferred taxes (TXDC) plus equity in net loss earnings 
(ESUBC) plus other funds from operations (FOPOX) plus gain 
(loss) from sale of property plant, and equipment and other 
investments (SPPIV). 
FundedStatus Fair value of pension assets (PPLAO + PPLAU) less the projected benefit 
obligation (PBPRO) scaled by market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) 
HighMTR Observations that fall within the highest quintile of MTR for a given industry-
year 
Leverage Total long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by total assets (AT) 
LowMTR Observations that fall within the lowest quintile of MTR for a given industry-year 





Simulated marginal tax rate (after financing) obtained from John Graham’s 
website (https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform. html) or from WRDS 
for Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) procedure 
EPC Obtained from the DOL (http://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ 
our-activities/public-disclosure/foia/form-500-datasets) 
SB_PRESENT_VAL_EXCES_CONT_AMT for years 2011-2017 and 
SB_EXCES_CONTR_CURR_YR_TOT_AMT for years 2009-2010 scaled by 
SB_TOT_PARTCP_CNT 
PlanSize The market value of plan assets (PPLAO+PPLAU) scaled by total assets (AT) 
Profitability Average return on assets (IBt + IBt-1) scaled by total assets (AT) 
TaxSavvy First, I calculate cash ETR as taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the sum of pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI) during the same period. Set to missing if 
denominator < 0. I then calculate the average cash ETR for a consecutive five year 
period and the standard deviation of cash ETR for the same five year period (t to t-
4). TaxSavvy is an indicator variable equal to 1 when firms are in the lowest 
quintile (for a given industry-year) of average cash ETR and the lowest quintile 
(for a given industry-year) for standard deviation of cash ETR, zero otherwise 
VarPremium Variable rate premium charged by the PBGC. Obtained from the DOL 
(http://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ 
our-activities/public-disclosure/foia/form-500-datasets) 
SB_TOT_VSTD_FNDNG_TGT_AMT / SB_TOT_PARTCP_CNT (from 
Schedule SB) multiplied by the variable rate premium amount for that year 
(https://www.pbgc. 
Gov/prac/prem/premium-rates)  
Volatility Standard Deviation of ROA (IBt / AT) for prior 5 years 
Assets Natural log of AT 
















Panel A:  
 
Panel B:  
 
___________________ 
Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the Graham MTR sample, and Panel B presents 
descriptive statistics for the BCG MTR sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 








Panel B:  
 
___________________ 
Table 3 presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics for the Graham MTR sample, and Panel B presents descriptive statistics 
for the BCG MTR sample. All bold and italicized correlations are significant at the 10 percent level. See 














Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (1), which is also listed below. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
 
EPCit = β0 + β1MTRit + β2Profitabilityit + β3Leverageit + β4MTBit + β5Volatilityit + β6Deficitit + 
β7FundedStatusit + β8PlanSizeit + β9VarPremiumit + β9Assetsit + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed 




Tax Savvy Firms 
 
___________________ 
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (2), which is also listed below. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
 
EPCit = β0 + β1MTRit + β2TaxSavvyit + β3TaxSavvy*MTRit + β4Profitabilityit + β5Leverageit + β6MTBit + 
β7Volatilityit + β8Deficitit + β9FundedStatusit + β10PlanSizeit + β11VarPremiumit + β12Assetsit + Year Fixed 









Variable Rate Premiums 
 
___________________ 
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (3), which is also listed below. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
 
EPCit = β0 + β1VarPremiumit + β2Profitabilityit + β3Leverageit + β4MTBit + β5Volatilityit + β6Deficitit + 











Marginal Tax Rate and Variable Rate Premiums 
 
___________________ 
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (4), which is also listed below. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
 
EPCit = β0 + β1HighMTRit + β2LowMTRit + β3VarPremiumit + β4HighMTR*VarPremiumit + 
β5LowMTR*VarPremiumit + β6Profitabilityit + β7Leverageit + β8MTBit + β9Volatilityit + β10Deficitit + 








Marginal Tax Rate Event Study 
 
___________________ 
Table 8 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (5), which is also listed below. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
 
EPCit = β0 + β1Timeit + β2MTRit + β3Time*MTRit + β4Profitabilityit + β5Leverageit  + β6MTBit + 
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